Throughout Malebranche’s works, he always allows that God acting by particular volitions is possible. It seems incontrovertible that creation was an act of a particular volition of God. But is there anywhere in his works where he explicitly identifies another act of particular willing of God? It seems that events surrounding Christ (or perhaps even Original Sin?) would be good candidates for particular volitions — but does Malebranche ever bite the bullet and outright state that they are so? [At the very end of his Treatise on Nature and Grace, in the Illuminations of this work, Malebranche seems to indicate that between Original Sin and Christ, anyone who was saved was saved by a particular volition of God (the elect were few in number). It isn't clear to me how to fit this statement into his general view.]
Any comments or thoughts would be most welcome!
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I seem to recall that somewhere in the response to Arnauld’s Dissertation he suggests that God sometimes chooses particular angels to do particular things, and does so by particular volitions. (Chapter V perhaps?)
The only plausible candidate for a particular volition with regard to Christ is the Incarnation itself. I can think of no place where he explicitly says this, although it does seem strongly implied by his repeated statements that creation itself has Christ in view.
I think, given the way he characterizes particular volitions in the first Illumination to the Treatse on Nature and Grace, that there are nearly insuperable epistemological problems in identifying examples here; in order for us to be reasonably certain that something was by particular volition and not by general volition, we would have to know that God was the only intelligent cause involved — if there are any intelligent occasional causes whose plans could particularize general laws, then it would make more sense (and be virtually required by Malebranche’s repeated insistence that God would only act with particular volitions if He had good reason) to attribute any particularity to them. And ruling out intelligent occasional causes would require ruling out angels and the soul of Christ, which we’re never in a position to do. This is pretty much Malebranche’s response to Arnauld’s attempt to claim that there are clear counterexamples — Arnauld will propose that (for example) God’s judgment on the Jews in the destruction of the Temple was a case of God accomplishing something by particular volition, and Malebranche will simply deny it by noting the particular occasional causes involved, appealing to divine foreknowledge to claim that God’s general laws could take all the relevant factors into account, and then combining this with the principle that God only acts according to particular volitions when Order requires it in order to conclude that God did it without acting by particular volitions.
What particular passage do you have in mind that seems to attribute election prior to Christ to particular volitions?
Thanks for these thoughts Brandon. I think you’re right about the epistemological problems in identifying concrete examples of certain instances of God acting by particular volitions. It is a bit odd that neither in the *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion* nor in *The Search* does Malebranche highlight the epistemological problem the way that he does in the *Treatise on Nature and Grace*.
The passage I have in find in this work is in response to the first objection of the Illustration (p.206 in the Riley translation): “God, before the birth of Jesus Christ, gave grace by particular wills. I grant it, if one wishes: the necessity of order demanded it; the occasional cause, according to order, could not be so soon established; the elect were very few in number.”
First Elucidation of the Treatise on Nature and Grace, section V: “Thus we may often be certain that God acts by general volitions, but we cannot have the same certainty that He acts by particular volitions, even in the most well-attested miracles”. So, for example, if a body moves without being struck by another, that is some evidence that it is being moved by a particular volition of God, but, for all we know, it could be that the body is moving because the particular volition of an angel is determining God’s general volition to move it.
Right – it is puzzling because in the *Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion* he does not seem so cagey about our ability to be certain particular volitions happen (just for instance: Dialogue VI, vii (p. 96 in the Jolley/Scott); Dialogue XI, ix (p. 207 in JS)). I wonder why the change in emphasis?