Margaret Cavendish, Observations on Experimental Philosophy Blog-Along (Part 2)

For this week’s meeting, we read Sections 1-12 of part 1 of the OEP, and continued discussing the Argumental Discourse.

Sorry for getting this post up late.

Here is a brief summary of some of the topics we covered:

• Cavendish’s “former thoughts” reply to an objection that her views on interior self-knowledge of all matter and the perceptual knowledge that comes from being self-moving matter requires a sort of double-counting of knowledge or lives.  We attempted to puzzle out the objection.
• We talked a bit more about the relationship between body, figure, and motion, for Cavendish
• Cavendish is insistent on some sort of isolation of the sense modalities, in terms of the knowledge they can attain, but also regards them all as sources of knowledge.
• Cavendish takes a fairly strong stand in favor of “rational perception” as the grounds of our knowledge, rather than sense perception.
• Our principle errors come from being finite perceivers attempting to perceive an object (nature) that is infinite.
• Cavendish extensively criticizes microscopy, arguing that valuable science would be seeking advances in agriculture, animal breeding, architecture (for improving shelter), economics, and the science of improving schools and courts of law, as well as unifying churches.  In my favorite quote from the selection, Cavendish gives this analogy for the work being done by microscopers:

“But, as boys that play with watery bubbles or fling dust into each other’s eyes, or make a hobbyhorse of snow, are worthy of reproof rather than praise, for wasting their time with useless sports; so those that addict themselves to unprofitable arts, spend more time than they reap benefit thereby.”

• We also discussed some of Cavendish’s views on how figure grounds properties like weight.
• We discussed the possibility of reading some of Cavendish’s philosophical poetry as part of our readings.

 

The reading for next time is sections 13-23.

Read Full Post »

Leibniz, internal action, and experience

Leibniz sometimes describes thought as an internal action (see this earlier Modsquad discussion). Moreover, in a couple of places he says that we can know this by experience. Indeed, he suggests we can know enough in this area by experience to establish some substantive philosophical truths about the mind.

Thus, in “On Nature Itself” (1698):

Indeed, if this view [occasionalism] were extended so far as to eliminate even the immanent actions of substances … then it would be as distant as it could possibly be from reason. For who would call into doubt that the mind thinks and wills, that we elicit in ourselves many thoughts and volitions, and that there is a spontaneity that belongs to us? If this were called into doubt, then not only would human liberty be denied and the cause of evil things be thrust into God, but it would also fly in the face of the testimony of our innermost experience and consciousness, testimony by which we ourselves sense that the things my opponents have transferred to God, without even a pretense of reason, are ours (ONI 10).

And later in a 1704 letter to Masham:

In this [pre-established harmony] I am doing no more than attributing to souls and bodies always and everywhere what we experience in them whenever the experience is distinct, that is to say, mechanical laws to bodies, and internal actions to souls (WFNS 206).

As well as using different terminology, these arguments have different purposes. The first is directed against a particular version of occasionalism, which denies all causal power to the human mind. To oppose this, Leibniz appeals to experience that he takes to show that we do have such power: “we elicit in ourselves many thoughts and volitions”. The comment to Masham suggests, however, the possibility of something stronger: of an argument from experience for the pre-established harmony.

That argument, if it is such would begin from a premise about our experience: when our experience is distinct, we see our souls working by internal action (rather than mechanical laws or external action). How it would proceed from there is less clear. Leibniz appeals to distinct experience. Perhaps too he is relying on a principle of uniformity according to which our minds always work in the way we see they sometimes – those distinctly experienced times? – work. This appeal to uniformity fits well with the general themes of Leibniz’s letter.

It would be intriguing if Leibniz really was suggesting an argument from experience for the pre-established harmony here. And such a thing would not be entirely unprecedented for him. Recall the way he appeals to the evidence of “Swammerdam, Malpighi, and Leeuwenhoek, the best observers of our time” in the “New System”. But perhaps this is straining the text of the letter to Masham too much, and all Leibniz aims to do is indicate that his system, in which souls only ever cause changes in themselves, is not opposed to all experience. We know at least, he might just be saying, that our souls sometimes cause changes in themselves. So however strange my view might seem, it does not go against all experience. This more modest reading would also tie back in to the comment in “On Nature Itself” – for the occasionalist there has gone against the very thing that experience tells us and Leibniz’s system upholds.

A lack of supporting texts making the bolder argument inclines me to the more modest reading – watch me talk myself out of the more exciting bit of the post even while I’m still writing it – but the bolder reading is not completely ungrounded. Any thoughts out there?

Read Full Post »

Margaret Cavendish, Observations on Experimental Philosophy Blog-Along (Part 1)

Today was the first meeting of the spatially discontinuous Margaret Cavendish reading group.  As foretold in a recent blog post, I will be posting here, alongside the progress of the reading group, so that people who aren’t in the group itself, but want to work through Cavendish’s text, can participate.

The reading for today’s meeting was Cavendish’s “Argumental Discourse”, whose full title is:

An Argumental Discourse

Concerning some principal subjects in natural philosophy; necessary for the better understanding, not only of this, but all other philosophical works, hitherto written by the authoress.

The discourse is written as a quasi-dialogue between Cavendish’s “former thoughts” and her “latter thoughts”.  In essence this portion of the text involves Cavendish subjecting her prior commitments to a critical interrogation.

The sorts of questions concerned in the discourse tend to revolve around Cavendish’s commitment to materialism, and the particular details of her materialist system.  Here are some examples of the questions discussed (please do not take these formulations as canonical):

• How can there be “several degrees” of matter: animate, inanimate; sensitive, rational?
• How do the various degrees of matter relate with respect to producing/transferring motion?
• Does matter have infinite parts?
• How do the modes of matter relate to matter itself?
• How can inanimate matter be living and possess knowledge?

The section ends with Cavendish herself suggesting that she is inclined towards her “former thoughts”, though officially leaving the adjudication of the dispute up to the impartial reader.

We spent a good portion of the time trying to get clear on several different notions of parthood that seemed to be in play, as well as in trying to understand Cavendish’s commitment to complete blending of sensitive, rational, and inanimate matter.

The plan for next time is to continue discussing the Argumental Discourse, but also to push forward into the main text, with the plan to read through Part 1, Section XII on whether humans could be made to fly as birds do.

I want to get this post up as soon as possible, so people can post to it, but I may post some more of the notes that I took in the comments when I get a chance later today.

Read Full Post »

NYC Early Modern Events

This is just a reminder that there is a calendar for early modern events in the NYC area:

https://sites.google.com/site/nycearlymodernphilosophyevents/upcoming-and-recent-events

…and a request that folks who are organizing or attending events missing from this calendar reach out so that the calendar can be as complete as possible.

Thanks!

Jessica

jgordonroth (at) gmail (dot) com

Read Full Post »

Cavendish Reading Group Blog-Along

I am going to be trying out an online video-chat reading group of Margaret Cavendish’s “Observations on Experimental Philosophy” this term, which is very exciting, obviously.  When I posted to my Facebook to gauge interest, I got about 19 people who responded!  Of course, no one time worked for everyone, so I picked a time that seemed to work for the most people.  Then I realized we could involve more people if we also had a blog-based way to participate.

So, there will be blog-along threads going in rough tandem with the reading group’s schedule. I will post regular threads here so that people not in the reading group can still get involved in the Cavendish discussions!

The first “meeting” will be on January 20th, so around that time, I will post a thread for discussing the first block of reading, which is Cavendish’s “Argumental Discourse”.  We will be using the Cambridge University Press Critical Edition, and if you would like to read along with us, I highly recommend you purchase a copy as well.

Happy New Year, Everyone!

Read Full Post »